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SOME FACTORS INFLUENCING THE OUTCOME
OF FELONY APPEALS IN MISSOURI*
JULES B. GERARD'
Recently I completed a study of all of the felony appeals decided by the
Missouri Supreme Court during the two year period ending March 1, 1964.
Its purpose was to test the accuracy of the United States Supreme Court's
assumption that the absence of a lawyer makes a "meaningless ritual" of a
felony appeal.' That investigation uncovered other factors, notably prior
convictions, which seemed to influence the outcome of appeals. But since
they were unrelated to lawyer involvement they were not discussed.
This note presents the material omitted from the first study. Its purpose,
however, is not to venture conclusions. The mere coincidence of two events
does not prove a causal relationship between them. So, for example, the
fact that affirmance rates vary directly with prior convictions does not prove
that past records cause appeals to be affirmed. But it does suggest that an
investigation into such a possibility might prove fruitful. The purpose of
this note, then, is to offer a few suggestions for future research.
I
The data relied upon in both of these articles was obtained from the
official files of the Missouri Supreme Court.3 This causes some problems in
identifying defendants with prior convictions. Since 1959, the sole purpose
of Missouri's habitual criminal act has been to transfer the function of
sentencing from the jury to the judge." The act comes into play only when
* The field research described in the text was made possible by a grant from Team-
sters Local 688, Labor-Management Charitable Foundation. The Foundation is not
responsible for the opinions expressed herein.
Steven Edelstein, Class of 1966, conducted the field research and prepared the tables.
t Associate Professor of Law, Washington University.
I. Gerard, The Right to Counsel On Appeal in Missouri, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 463.
2. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).
3. The research methods employed are described in detail in Gerard, supra note 1, at
464-65. They will not be repeated here.
4. The former statute provided that any person who had previously been convicted of
a felony should, upon a subsequent felony conviction, be sentenced (1) to life imprison-
ment, if the subsequent conviction was for an offense punishable by life imprisonment or
by a term which might extend to life, or (2) to the longest term possible, if the subsequent
conviction was for an offense punishable by a term of years. Mo. REV. STAT. § 556.280
(1949).
The old act was repealed on June 15, 1959 (effective August 28, 1959), and the
present statute enacted to replace it. The present law reads:
If the subsequent offense be such that, upon a first conviction, the offender could
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the prosecutor alleges in the indictment or information that the defendant
has previously been convicted of a felony. Its effect is to give to the prose-
cutor the decision whether the judge or the jury will impose sentence. If
the prosecutor wants the jury to do the sentencing, he simply does not allege
prior convictions. But this does not mean the jury will be unaware of
them. If the defendant takes the stand, he still may be cross-examined
about his previous record.
There are instances in which the prosecutor deliberately chooses not to
allege prior convictions. So far as can be determined, these occur exclusively
in cases, such as murder and forcible rape, in which he intends to ask for
the death penalty. It is noteworthy, for example, that prior convictions were
alleged in only 2 of 21 murders, and 2 of 8 rapes. By contrast, prior convic-
tions were alleged in 20 of 27 robberies and in 15 of 24 larcenies.' A defend-
ant in a capital case usually testifies in his own defense and subjects him-
self to cross-examination. His prior record thereby becomes known even
though the prosecutor did not mention it in the information. But the prose-
cutor still has a scandalized and outraged jury to which he can appeal for a
death sentence.
Because the data for this study was taken from official files, only those
cases in which the indictment or information alleged prior convictions could
be so classified. But it is certain that at least some of the defendants listed
as first offenders in the tables actually had, and were known by the juries
to have, prior records. All such cases were probably convictions of murder
or rape, but this cannot be assumed.
The Missouri Supreme Court decided 163 felony cases during the two
year period studied.' Five of these were collateral attacks, in the nature of
habeas corpus, under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 27.26." They were
ignored because they were not true appeals. Additional information about
115 of the remaining 158 cases was secured from lawyers listed as attorneys
of record in the official court files.
During this period, there were three ways of appealing a felony convic-
be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary, then the person shall receive such
punishment provided by law for the subsequent offense as the trial judge determines
after the person has been convicted. Mo. Rv. STAT. § 556.280 (1959).
There is no legislative history on this statute, nor do the daily newspapers of the period
carry any articles which throw light on the cause of the change.
5. See Table 2, infra.
6. Additional information about the cases, and research methods employed, will be
found in Gerard, supra note 1.
7. The rule provides in pertinent part:
A prisoner in custody under sentence and claiming a right to be released on the
ground that such sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution . . . or is
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may file a motion at any time ....
Mo. SuP. CT. R. 27.26.
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Table 11
COMPARISON OF AFFIRMANCES BY CRIME AND BY SENTENCE
Sentences
1-2 years
No. of cases
No. aff'd
% afld
3-5 years
No. of cases
No. aff'd
% aff'd
6.10 years
No. of cases
No. aff'd
% af'd
II or more years
No. of cases
No. afdd
% a lrd
Life
No. of cases
No. ai'd
% affd
Death
No. of cases
No. aff'd
% aff'd
Assault Burglary Murder Robbery Stealing
3 11
2 7
67% 64%
4 162
1 15
25% 94%
3
3
100%
4
4
100%
Other Total
0 0 9 17 40
5 13 27
56% 76% 68%
0 3 10 15 48
2 8 13 39
67% 80% 87% 81%
9 7 8 53
7 6 7 5
78% 86% 88% 100%
0 7 145
4 13
57% 93%
0 0 4 2
1 2
25% 100%
0 0 3
2
67%
114  43
7 35
64% 81%
0 4
4
100%
0 0 6
0 0 3
50%
0 0 2 5
1 3
50% 60%
Total
No. of crimes 14 36 21 27 24 49 171
No. aff'd 10 29 13 24 18 38 132
% aiff'd 71% 81% 62% 89% 75% 77% 77%
1. This table excludes (a) two cases in which the state was the appellant, (b) one case
in which the sentence was a fine only, and (c) five cases attacking convictions under the
provisions of Rule 27.26. See text for further discussion.
The "total" figures in this table vary from those in other tables because 15 of the
163 cases studied involved more than one crime, and this table is prepared on the basis of
crimes rather than cases. There were two defendants in another case; both are counted in
this table.
2. Five cases were reversed solely because of errors made in connection with prior of-
fenses. One was reversed because the information was defective in pleading prior convic-
tions. Four were reversed because the method of proving prior convictions was faulty.
Because it is reasonably clear that the sentences had nothing to do with the outcome of
the appeals, the latter four cases are counted as affirmances in this table. One such case is
included in the figure 16 above, and the others are pointed out in notes 3 and 5 below.
The reversal because of a faulty information is not counted as an affirmance and is located
by note 4.
3. Includes one affirmance of the kind discussed in note 2.
4. Includes the reversal discussed in note 2.
5. Includes two affirmances of the kind discussed in note 2.
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tion.8 One was to appeal on the motion for new trial. Under this method,
the Missouri Supreme Court reviewed the trial transcript for the errors
alleged in the motion for new trial. No brief was filed for the defendant,
and no argument was made on his behalf. The second method was to
appeal on a brief. This method was identical to the traditional appeal
except that no oral argument was presented for the defendant. The third
method, of course, was the usual one of filing a brief and making oral
argument.
II
Table 1 breaks the cases down by crime and by sentence. It discloses a
wide variation in affirmance rates between major types of crime. The highest
rate was for robbery, 89 per cent, the lowest, 62 per cent, for murder. One
was 12 points higher, the other 15 points lower, than the overall affirmance
rate of 77 per cent. Whether these variations were due to the presence of
eye witnesses, which the high rate for robbery suggests, or to the presence
of other tangible evidence, which the rate for burglary (81 per cent) sug-
gests, or to some other reason, such as peculiar rules of evidence, is unknown.
The low figure for murder may be explainable by the fact that seven of the
cases carried sentences of life or death, and four of these were reversed. If
these seven cases are eliminated, the affirmance rate for murder convictions
increases to 71 per cent (10 of 14).
It is generally believed that the chances of securing a reversal on appeal
increase with the length of the sentence. Table 1 indicates this belief is
mistaken unless the sentence is life or death. The affirmance rate climbed
steadily from 68 per cent for sentences of 2 years or less to 86 per cent for
sentences of 11 years or more. It then dropped to 50 per cent for life sen-
tences, and 60 per cent for capital cases. This suggests that there may be a
correlation between weak cases and light sentences.
One might expect the length of the sentence to increase if the defendant
has prior convictions. Table 2 shows that this is what happened, except,
interestingly, for the crime of burglary. This fact is hard to explain, unless
it reflects a belief that burglars are relatively less dangerous to society.
Affirmance rates were then plotted as a function of prior convictions. The
results were dramatic, as Table 3 testifies. Except for the atypical cases
decided by the court en banc,9 affirmance rates were uniformly higher for
defendants with prior convictions. The difference in Division 1 was
8. A more detailed description of these procedures can be found in Gerard, supra note
1, at 465-68.
9. Only ten cases were decided by the court en banc, and the sentence was capital
punishment in five of them. See Gerard, supra note 1, at 474.
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Table 2
COMPARISON OF SENTENCES (IN YEARS) BY PRIOR CONVICTIONS
(SELECTED CRIMES ONLY)
Assault Burglary Murder Rape Robbery Stealing
No priors
No. of cases (11) (18) (19) (6) (7) (9)
Maximum 14 10 death' death2  15 5
Minimum 1/4 2 10 2 5 1
Median 4 3 15 10 10 2
Prior Convictions
No. of cases (3) (18) (2) (2) (20) (15)
Maximum 35 10 death 50 life3  10
Minimum 20 2 30 45 7 2
Median 25 5 - - 15 5
1. Death penalties were imposed in two cases, life sentences in four cases.
2. Two cases.
3. Two cases.
Table 31
AFFIRMANCES COMPARED TO PRIOR CONVICTIONS
Division 1 Division 2 En bane Total
No. No. No. No. No. No. No. No. %
cases aff'd cases aff'd cases aff'd cases aff'd aff'd
MNT
No priors 21 17 20 15 1 1 42 33 79%
Priors 18 16 18 18 - - 36 34 95%
Brief only
No priors 9 7 8 7 - - 17 14 82%
Priors 5 4 4 3 1 1 10 8 80%
Full argument
No priors 10 7 15 7 6 3 31 17 55%
Priors 11 10 2 2 2 0 15 12 80%
Total no. cases 74 61 67 52 10 5 151 118 78%
No priors 40 31 43 29 7 4 90 64 71%
Priors 34 30 24 23 3 1 61 54 89%
I. Excludes (a) five attacks under Rule 27.26, (b) two cases in which the state was
the appellant, and (c) five cases in which the only error found on appeal was one con-
cerning the pleading or proof of prior convictions. The latter are omitted because it
was impossible for the court to determine, under the circumstances, whether or not the
defendants actually had previous convictions.
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Table 41
AFFIRMANCES: PRIOR CONVICTIONS AND TYPE OF ATTORNEY
Retained Attorney Other Attorney
No. No. % No. No. V
cases aff'd aff'd cases aff'd aff'd
MNT
No priors 20 15 75% 5 4 80%
Priors 4 3 75% 14 14 100%
Brief Only
No priors 9 7 78% 0 0 -
Priors 3 3 100% 3 1 33%
Full Argument
No priors 16 8 50% 6 4 67%
Priors 7 5 71% 6 6 100%
Totals
No priors 45 30 67% 11 8 73%
Priors 14 11 79% 23 21 91%
Total, all cases 59 41 70% 34 29 85%
1. Excludes (a) two cases in which state appealed, (b) five attacks under Rule 27.26,
and (c) five cases in which the only error found was one concerning the pleading or
proof or prior convictions. See Table 3, note 1.
between 88 per cent (30 of 34) and 77 per cent (31 of 40). The difference
was even more striking in Division 2, dropping from 96 per cent (23 of 24)
for those with prior convictions, to 67 per cent (29 of 43) for those with-
out. Overall, the difference in affirmance rates between those with prior
convictions and those without was 18 points.
The data reviewed in the earlier study suggested that lawyers who were
retained were more likely to be successful in handling their appeals than
lawyers who were not.' Table 4 was an effort to compare the success rates
of each in handling the different types of defendants, first offenders and
repeaters. The absolute numbers derived from making this comparison were
small because the categories were so numerous. They may be too small to
be statistically reliable. Assuming reliability, the figures tend to support the
implications of the first study.
10. There were some difficulties in classifying attorneys as "retained." Briefly, the
category of "retained attorney" included all lawyers who said they were retained (on the
questionnaires they returned) (a) either at the trial or for the appeal, (b) whether or
not they were paid, and (c) irrespective of who retained or paid them. "Other attorneys"
were all other lawyers, except those who were also defendants. See Gerard, supra note 1,
at 472.
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The salient feature of Table 4, however, is reliable and it appeared
unexpectedly. The table reveals that only 14, less than 25 per cent, of the
59 cases handled by retained attorneys involved defendants with prior con-
victions. By contrast, 68 per cent (23 of 34) of the clients of other attorneys
were repeaters. What this means is anybody's guess; the possibilities are
manifold. One is that defendants who have been through the mill are likely
to believe that one lawyer is as good (or as poor) as the next, and therefore
that there is no point in paying for something they can get for free.
1I. Subject, of course, to the caveat expressed in Section I of the text, supra, concern-
ing the identification of cases involving first offenders.
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